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INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years ago, the case of Karen Ann Quinlan, a young 
woman rendered profoundly mentally disabled and incompetent, 
instigated an enduring national debate as it moved through the 
New Jersey courts.1 The In re Quinlan decision-which arose a 
few years after bioethics became a focused discipline in the 
United States, with initial national debates over organ transplan-
tation2 and the definition of "death" in the law -launched the 
nation on a profound transformation in the legal, medical, and 
cultural treatment of the medically dependent and disabled.4 
Fourteen years after Quinlan, in the wake of that change, the 
Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health.5 There the Court held that 
Missouri (and hence the states generally) could require "clear 
and convincing evidence" of an incompetent patient's desires be-
* Attorney & Director, Project in Law & Bioethics, Americans United for Life. I 
am grateful to Edward S. Lloyd for his research assistance. 
1. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 70 N.J. 10 (1976), cen. denied sub nom., Garger v. 
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
2 See David Louisell, Transplantation: Existing Legal Constraints, in ETHICS IN 
MEDICAL PROGRESS 78 (G. Wolstenholme & M. O'Connor eds., 1966). 
3. See Alexander M. Capron & Leon Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards 
for Determining Human Death· An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87 
(1972). 
4. On the significance of the Quinlan case, see, for example, Edward R. Grant & 
Oarke D. Forsythe, From 'Natural Death' to 'Aid-in-Dying': Reflections on the American 
Judicial Experience, in EUTHANASIA: THE GOOD OF THE PATIENT, THE GOOD OF 
SOCIETY 151, 152 (Robert I. Misbin ed., 1992); Dennis J. Horan, The Quinlan Case, in 
DEATH, DYING & EUTHANASIA 525 (Dennis J. Horan & David Mall eds., 1980); C. 
Everett Koop & Edward R. Grant, The "Small Beginnings" of Euthanasia: Examining 
the Erosion in Legal Prohibitions Against Mercy-Killing, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL'Y 585 (1986). 
5. 497 u.s. 261 (1990). 
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fore allowing the withdrawal of life-sustaining nutrition and hy-
dration.6 In 1997, acknowledging the considerable change that 
had transpired, and the ongoing nationwide debate, the Supreme 
Court rejected a federal constitutional right to assisted suicide in 
Washington v. Glucksberg1 and Vacco v. Quil/.8 The Court left 
the issue of assisted suicide to the states, and, in the wake of 
those decisions, the voters of Oregon have re-approved assisted 
suicide/ while those of Michigan and Maine have rejected it.10 
Since Glucksberg and Vacco, two major cases involving in-
competent patients and the withdrawal of nutrition and hydra-
tion have been decided by state courts. In 2001, the California 
Supreme Court decided Conservatorship of Wendland,11 which 
rejected the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from con-
scious but disabled wards and received little media attention.12 In 
contrast, Schiavo/3 like Quinlan and Cruzan, provoked intense 
media attention and sparked a nationwide discussion over the 
appropriate treatment of incompetent persons, who should make 
those decisions, and how they should be made. 
In a sense, the Wendland and Schiavo cases "implemented" 
the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan. The state courts ap-
plied the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, and the fed-
eral courts deferred to the state courts. But did the law ade-
quately protect the life of Theresa Schiavo? Did the courts? 
Were the procedures applied fair and adequate? 
Pursuant to Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco, the states may 
constitutionally adopt policies and procedures which protect the 
lives of disabled, unconscious persons.14 Neurologically-impaired 
6. I d. at 279. 
7. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
8. 521 u.s. 793 (1997). 
9. Edward R. Grant & Paul Benjamin Linton, Relief or Reproach· Euthanasia 
Rights in the Wake of Measure 16,74 OR. L. REv. 449,449 (1995). 
10. J.C. Oleson, Swilling Hemlock: The Legal Ethics of Defending a Client Who 
Wishes to Volunteer for Execution, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 147, 193 (2006). 
11. 28 P.3d 151,26 Cal. 4th 519 (2001). 
12. The case received little media attention perhaps because Robert Wendland died 
before the court's decision and the California Supreme Court denied withdrawal of nutri-
tion and hydration from the conscious ward. 28 P.3d at 154 n.l. 
13. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 2001 ); In 
re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 2001); In re Guardianship 
of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 2001); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 
So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. a. App. 2003), review denied, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003); Bush v. 
Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004) (invalidating "Terri's Law" as a violation of separa-
tion of powers), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121 (2005). 
14. Whether the state has to provide life-sustaining treatment is another question 
not addressed here: For a discussion of this issue, see DeShaney v. Winnebago Depart-
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human beings are entitled to protection as "persons" under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution because 
"person" within the meaning of these amendments encompasses 
all human beings. Their degree of neurological impairment does 
not undermine their protection as "persons." 
In light of what Wend/and and Schiavo revealed about the 
inadequacy of state statutes and judicial procedures, the states 
should consider legislation that (1) enhances the educational 
value of advance directives, (2) adopts presumptions in favor of 
sustaining the lives of the unconscious persons if they do not 
execute advance directives, (3) enhances judicial evaluation of 
conflicts of interests by guardians, ( 4) ensures that guardians are 
exercising informed consent, and ( 5) clarifies procedures to en-
sure efficient resolution when the guardian's decision is chal-
lenged by family members. 
I. FROM QUINLAN TO CRUZAN 
The common law traditionally recognized a right to self-
determination regarding the acceptance or refusal of medical 
treatment-a right to refuse medical treatment, strictly speaking, 
but not a "right to die." 15 The landmark judgment in Quinlan 
was rather narrow-at least compared to subsequent state court 
decisions-but the court's rationale applied legal concepts, like 
substituted judgment and the constitutional right of privacy, in 
novel ways that had broad repercussions. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court affirmed a right to refuse medical treatment, a res-
pirator in the case of Karen Quinlan, 16 and held that this right 
was a constitutional right which could be exercised for an in-
competent patient through the "substituted judgment" of a fam-
'1 b 17 1 ymem er. 
Despite the narrow scope of the judgment, the Quinlan case 
instigated significant legal change in the treatment of the chroni-
cally and terminally ill. Quinlan "prompted" the passage of liv-
ing will legislation in the states, beginning with the California 
Natural Death Act in 1976.18 Traditional common law rules of 
ment of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
15. For a discussion of this issue, see generally Dennis J. Horan, Comment on the 
Living Will, in DEA TII, DYING & EUTHANASIA, supra note 4, at 369, 370. 
16. Her parents never attempted to withdraw Karen's feeding tube, considering it 
to be basic sustenance. 
17. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664, 70 N.J. 10, 41 (1976). 
18. Grant & Forsythe, supra note 4, at 152; Horan, Comment on the Living Will, 
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tort, battery, and informed consent were superseded by statutes 
and court decisions. Medical care of the chronically and termi-
nally ill became more formalized, with layers of procedures and 
state and federallaws.19 The common law definition of "death" 
was legislatively expanded to include "whole brain death" (be-
ginning with Kansas legislation in 1970).20 States passed legisla-
tion to fill the perceived gaps and to clarify the rights of the 
chronically and terminally ill. 
Beginning with California in 1976, virtually every state (and 
the District of Columbia) has authorized advanced directives by 
statute.21 A review in 1986 of the changes wrought found that 
legislation and court decisions between 1976 and 1986 had 
weakened existing legal prohibitions against euthanasia.22 Most 
states have enacted legislation authorizing the withholding of 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (DNR), beginning with New 
York in 1988.23 At least 37 states have surrogate decision-making 
statutes that may OJ?..erate in the absence of a surrogate desig-
nated by the patient. 
The legislative developments were accompanied by a series 
of state court decisions after Quinlan- In re Conroy, 25 In re 
Jobes,26 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital,n Gardner/.s In re 
Grant,29 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,31J In 
supra note 15, app. at 374. 
19. See Horan, Comment on the Living WiU, supra note 15, at 369. 
20. See Capron & Kass, supra note 3, at 88. 
21. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF 
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING 7-7, 7-187 (3d ed. 2004) (Table 7-1, listing state stat-
utes). See generally Dennis J. Horan & Thomas J. Marzen, Death with Dignity and the 
Living Will: A Commentary on Legislative Development, 5 J. LEGIS. 81 (1978); Susan R. 
Martyn & Lynn Balshone Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Terminally Ill: 
The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779 (1984). 1985 was a 
"decisive year" in state legislative adoption of living wills. "At the outset of 1985, less 
than half of the states had enacted such Jaws. By the end of 1985, living will laws were on 
the books in thirty-six states." Koop & Grant, supra note 4, at 598 & n.36. 
22. Koop & Grant, supra note 4, at 599. 
23. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 21, at 6-19. 
24. I d. at 8-23 (Table 8-1, listing statutes). 
25. 486 A.2d 1209, 98 N.J. 321 (1985). 
26. 529 A.2d 434, 108 N.J. 394 (1987). 
27. 497 N.E.2d 626, 398 Mass. 417 (1986) (permitting withdrawal of assisted nutri-
tion and hydration from patient in persistent vegetative state by 4-3 vote). 
28. 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987) (permitting withdrawal of nutrition and hydration by 
4-3 vote). 
29. 747 P.2d 445, 109 Wash.2d 545 (1987) (en bane), modified, 757 P.2d 534 (1988) 
(holding 5-4 that resuscitation measures could be withheld but not nutrition and hydra-
tion). 
30. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), affd sub. nom., Cruzan v. Di-
rector, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
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re Estate of Longeway,31 In re Estate ofGreenspan32 -which fur-
ther defined the right to refuse treatment and reflected great 
controversy over the permissibility of withdrawing nutrition and 
hydration from incompetent and mentally disabled patients. This 
trend of cases, by narrow margins and over significant dissents, 
rejected any distinction between medical treatment and nutrition 
and hydration and allowed the withdrawal of nutrition and hy-
dration on the same basis as any medical treatment. Perhaps 
Schiavo indicates that the equivalence seen by judges is not 
shared by the public. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CRUZAN, 
VACCO & GLUCKSBERG 
In 1990, the Supreme Court entered the field with its first 
"right to die" case, the landmark Cruzan decision.33 The Court 
upheld, by the narrowest of margins, five-four, the authority of 
states to maintain nutrition and hydration for patients in a "per-
sistent vegetative state," except upon evidence of the patient's 
intent by "clear and convincing evidence."34 The Supreme Court 
resisted the request to "constitutionalize" the area along the 
lines of a "right to privacy" based on Roe v. Wade;35 its holding 
was narrow and deferential to the states. It did not create a con-
stitutional "right to die" or a right to suicide.36 The Supreme 
Court in Cruzan held that "Missouri may permissibly place an 
increased risk of an erroneous decision on those seeking to ter-
31. 549 N.E.2d 292, 133 Ill. 2d 33 (1989) (permitting withdrawal of nutrition and 
hydration by 4-2 vote). 
32. 558 N.E.2d 1194, 137 lll. 2d 1 (1990) (allowing, by 4-2 vote, public guardian to 
discontinue nutrition and hydration if intent of patient in "persistent vegetative state" 
regarding withdrawal of feeding tube was established by "clear and convincing evi-
dence"). 
33. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
34. ld. at 280 ("Missouri requires that evidence of the incompetent's wishes as to 
the withdrawal of treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The question, 
then, is whether the United States Constitution forbids the establishment of this proce-
dural requirement by the State. We hold that it does not."). ld. at 282 ("This Court has 
mandated an intermediate standard of proof-'clear and convincing evidence'-when 
the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 'particularly important' 
and 'more substantial than mere loss of money."' (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 756 (1982)). 
35. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
36. The Missouri trial court, however, upon remand of the case, found "clear and 
convincing evidence" of Nancy Cruzan's wishes, allowed the withdrawal of the nutrition 
and hydration, and Nancy Cruzan died on December 26, 1990. See Step-by-Step Chro-
nology of Nancy Cruzan Case Leading to Her Death, http://www.christianliferesources. 
com/?2161 (posted Jan. 1, 1992). 
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minate an incompetent individual's life-sustaining treatment."37 
The Court affirmed Missouri's asserted state interests: "We do 
not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of an 
informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to 
starve to death."38 And, perhaps most importantly, the Court de-
clared that the states have "an unqualified interest in the preser-
vation of human life. "39 
In the wake of Cruzan, litigation was launched to make an 
end-run around the democratic process and overturn the anti-
assisted suicide laws of the states and create a constitutional 
right to assisted suicide.40 An extensive national debate com-
menced over the implications of any attempt to legalize direct 
killing or assisted suicide-including the impossibility of limiting 
the class of patients, the difficulty of enforcing any regulations, 
and the weakening of the care of the chronically and terminally 
ill who do not want assisted suicide.41 
In 1997, the Supreme Court refused to create a federal con-
stitutional right to assisted suicide and left the issue to the 
states.42 In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court rejected a sub-
stantive due process right to assisted suicide and held that the 
Washington statutory prohibition did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.43 The judgment was unanimous, though the Court's 
opinion was supported five-four (in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Tho-
mas). Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer filed vari-
ous opinions concurring in the judgment. The Court recognized 
that "[t]he States' assisted-suicide bans ... are longstanding ex-
pressions of the States' commitment to the protection and pres-
ervation of all human life."44 The Court reaffirmed that the states 
have an "'unqualified interest in the preservation of human 
37. 497 U.S. at 283. 
38. Id. at 280. 
39. /d. at 282. 
40. Washington voters rejected a ballot initiative to legalize assisted suicide in 1991. 
California voters rejected a similar ballot initiative in 1993. Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 u.s. 702,717 (1997). 
41. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND 1HE LAW, WHEN 
DEATII IS SOUGIIT: AsSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTIIANASIA IN 1HE MEDICAL CoNTEXT, 
at vii-iii (May 1994); Oarke D. Forsythe, The Incentives and Disincentives Created by 
Legalizing Physician· Assisted Suicide, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 680, .~1 
(1997); Grant & Forsythe, supra note 4, at 153-62; Thomas J. Marzen, et al., Suzcide: A 
Constitutional Right?, 24 Duo. L. REv. 1 (1985). 
42 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702; Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997}. 
43. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728; see also Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die 
and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 673. 
44. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710. 
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life."45 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the lower court's 
holding that the state's interest in protecting life "depends on the 
'medical condition and the wishes of the person whose life is at 
stake,"' and recognized that "Washington ... has rejected this 
sliding-scale approach and, through its assisted-suicide ban, in-
sists that all persons' lives, from beginning to end, regardless of 
physical or mental condition, are under the full protection of the 
law."46 
The Court noted, with emphasis, three fundamental ele-
ments of homicide and suicide law that highlight the protection 
of human beings: First, "[t]he right to life and to personal secu-
rity is not only sacred in the estimation of the common law, but it 
is inalienable. "47 Second, "the consent of a homicide victim is 
'wholly immaterial to the guilt of the person who caused (his 
death)."48 Third, 
the prohibitions against assisting suicide never contained ex-
ceptions for those who were near death. Rather, 'the life of 
those to whom life had become a burden-of those who 
[were] hopelessly diseased or fatally wounded-nay, even the 
lives of criminals condemned to death, [were] under the pro-
tection of the law, equally as the lives of those who [were] in 
the full tide of life's enjoyment, and anxious to continue to 
live.'49 
As Arthur J. Dyck, the Saltonstall Professor of Population Eth-
ics at Harvard School of Public Health, has summarized it, the 
Court's opinion identified "three major reasons that killing is 
wrong when it is wrong: (1) killing is a violation of an individ-
ual's inalienable right to life; (2) killing runs counter to a human 
being's natural love of life; and (3) killing violates the sanctity of 
lif .~ e. 
45. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 
497 u.s. 261,282 (1990)). 
46. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729 (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 
558 (1979) (emphasis added). 
47. Id. at 714 (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 37 S.E.2d 43, 47, 184 Va. 1009, 
1018-19 (1946)). 
48. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 714 (brackets in original). The Model Penal Code's 
drafters also recognized that "the interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by 
the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to partici-
pate in taking the life of another, even though the act may be accomplished with the con-
sent, or at the request, of the suicide victim." Id. at 715-16 (quoting MODEL PENAL 
CODE§ 210.5 cmt. 5, p. 100 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980)). 
49. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 714 (quoting Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 
(1872)) (brackets in original). 
50. ARlHUR J. DYCK, LIFE'S WORlH: THE CAsE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE 48 
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The Court also strongly affirmed various "state interests" in 
prohibiting assisted suicide. The States "'may properly decline to 
make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular indi-
vidual may enjoy .... This remains true, as Cruzan makes clear, 
even for those who are near death. "51 In addition, "the State has 
an interest in protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, 
the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and mis-
takes."52 Furthermore, "[t]he State's interest here goes beyond 
protecting the vulnerable from coercion; it extends to protecting 
disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice, negative and 
inaccurate stereotypes, and 'societal indifference. "'53 
In Vacca v. Quil/,54 the Court rejected the claim that New 
York's prohibition on assisting suicide violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 55 The Court affirmed 
that "the distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and en-
dorsed in the medical profession and in our legal traditions, is 
both important and logical; it is certainly rational."56 The Court 
emphasized that 
our assumption [in Cruzan] of a right to refuse treatment 
was grounded not, as the Court of Appeals supposed, on the 
proposition that patients have a general and abstract 'right to 
hasten death,' but on well established, traditional rights to 
bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching. . . . 
By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide, New 
York law follows a longstanding and rational distinction. 
New York's reasons for recognizing and acting on this dis-
tinction-including prohibiting intentional killing and pre-
serving life; preventing suicide; maintaining physicians' role 
as their patients' healers; protecting vulnerable people from 
indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pres-
sure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide towards 
euthanasia . . . . [are] valid and important public inter-
ests ... . 57 
(2002). 
51. 521 U.S. at 729-30 (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 282 (1990) (citation omitted). 
52 ld. at 731. 
53. /d. at 732. 
54. 521 u.s. 793 (1997). 
55. /d. at 797. 
56. /d. at 8()()....{)1. 
57. /d. at 807--00 (citations omitted). 
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III. WENDLAND & SCHIAVO 
The Supreme Court's "federalist" decisions in Glucksberg 
and Vacco shifted attention away from the federal courts and 
back toward state policy making. This has heightened the impor-
tance of state laws and advance directives. Since the Supreme 
Court's decisions, the supreme courts of California and the Flor-
ida have addressed two important cases involving the withdrawal 
of nutrition and hydration from mentally disabled patients who 
have left no express, written instructions nor appointed health 
care guardians. 
In 2001, in Conservatorship of Wendland, Robert Wend-
land's wife (appointed as a guardian or "conservator" under 
California law) sought a court order to withdraw nutrition and 
hydration from Wendland, who had been "conscious yet se-
verely disabled, both mentally and physically" for more than 
seven years. 58 He had executed no "formal instructions for 
health care or appointed an agent or surrogate for health care 
decisions."59 Wendland's wife was opposed by Wendland's 
mother and sister.60 The trial court denied the application, but 
the California Court of Appeals reversed.61 The California Su-
preme Court described Wendland as "conscious ... not termi-
nally ill, comatose, or in a persistent vegetative state."62 Applying 
state probate law, the supreme court reversed the court of ap-
peals and unanimously held that the conservator "may not with-
hold artificial nutrition and hydration from such a person absent 
clear and convincing evidence the conservator's decision is in ac-
cordance with either the conservatee's own wishes or best inter-
est. ,63 
The California Supreme Court recognized the significance 
of the case, noting that "no decision of which we are aware has 
approved a conservator's or guardian's proposal to withdraw ar-
tificial nutrition and hydration from a conscious conservatee or 
ward."64 The Wendland decision was expressly limited by the 
California Supreme Court to "a narrow class of persons: con-
scious conservatees who have not left formal directions ... and 
whose conservators propose to withhold life-sustaining treat-
58. Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 154, 26 Cal. 4th 519, 524 (2001). 
59. Id. at 153-54. 
60. ld. at 154. 
61. In re Conservatorship of Wendland, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (Cal. Q. App. 2000). 
62. 28 P.3d at 153. 
63. Id. at 154. 
64. ld. at 170. 
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ment for the purpose of causing their conservatees' deaths. "65 
While aware of the intent involved, the court, without any ex-
planation, distinguished the "conscious" ward from "perma-
nently unconscious patients, including those who are comatose 
or in a persistent vegetative state. "66 The court recognized the 
risk that a guardian might withdraw food and fluids from a con-
scious ward based on the belief "that the conservatee enjoys an 
unacceptable quality of life" but the court did not justify drawing 
the line at "consciousness. "67 
In Guardianship of Schiavo, the Florida courts granted the 
request of Michael Schiavo to withdraw nutrition and hydration 
from his wife, Theresa Schiavo, who-the court concluded-had 
been in a "persistent vegetative state" since 1990. 68 Theresa did 
not leave any written statement of her desires, but her husband, 
Michael Schiavo, sought to withdraw nutrition and hydration on 
the ground that that would be her wish based on past statements 
that she had allegedly made.69 The withdrawal of nutrition and 
hydration was opposed by Theresa's parents, the Schindlers. Af-
ter all appeals were exhausted in October, 2003, Theresa's feed-
ing tube was removed on October 15, 2003.70 On October 21, 
2003, the Florida legislature enacted a statute authorizing the 
Governor of Florida to intervene to prevent withdrawal of nutri-
tion and hydration.71 On September 23, 2004, the Florida Su-
preme Court unanimously declared the statute unconstitutional 
as a violation of separation of powers.72 Under intense media at-
tention, all judicial and legislative remedies were eventually ex-
hausted, and Theresa Schiavo died in March of2005. 
65. !d. at 175. The significant, last phrase, recognizing the motive of the conserva· 
tor, was used by the court (in a unanimous decision) several others times throughout the 
opinion. 
66. !d. at 175. 
67. !d. at 174. 
68. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In 
re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re Guardianship 
of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 
So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), review denied, 855 So. 2d 621(Fia. 2003); Bush v. 
Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004) (invaliding "Terri's Law" as a violation of separation 
of powers), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121 (2005). For a detailed history of the case, see the 
log compiled by Kathy Cerminara, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law 
Center, and Kenneth Goodman, University of Miami Ethics Programs, 
http://www.miami. edulethics/schiavo/timeline.htm. 
69. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 325 (Fla. 2004), cen. denied, 543 U.S. 1121 
(2005). 
70. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d at 325-28, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121. 
71. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d at 328, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121. 
72 Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121. 
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IV. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT & 
UNCONSCIOUS PERSONS 
485 
Do the states have a "compelling interest" in the lives of 
persons who are unconscious or in a persistent vegetative state? 
Due to the Supreme Court's tendency to introduce "balancing 
analysis" into every aspect of constitutional law over the past 
four decades, this is how the question is typically posed in consti-
tutionallaw.73 This is a significant shift in constitutional interpre-
tation. The Court's balancing analysis diminishes rights in the 
text of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from rights that 
precede government into mere state "interests," which can be 
balanced away or outweighed by other interests the justices 
might identify. 
Nevertheless, Cruzan and Glucksberg held that the states 
have an "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life." 
This is reinforced by the common law, the history and applica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the contemporary con-
sensus across the fifty states in defining "death" as either the 
common law standard of cardiopulmonary death or as "whole 
brain death."74 
The legal term "person" traditionally encompasses all living 
human beings in Anglo-American law; human being and person 
were considered synonymous at common law.75 This is reflected 
in modem dictionaries, which uniformly define a "person" as a 
"human being."76 The law may now consider "person" to include 
73. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); SlEPHEN PREssER, RECAYrURING THE CONSTITlJTION 49-
50 (1994); CHRisTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM 
CoNSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 286--89 (1986); Daniel A 
Farber & John E. Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate: Judicial Experience with the 1980s 
'Reasonableness Test,' 76 VA. L. REv. 519, 520 (1990); Clarke D. Forsythe, The Tradition 
of Interpretavism In Constitutional Interpretation, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 217, 229 (1987); 
Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 CoLO. L. REv. 319, 320 (1992). See generally 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 
(1987). 
74. Laura Dietz, et al., 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 422 (2004); David Randolph 
Smith, Legal Recognition of Neoconical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 853-54 n.14 
(1986) (citing 33 state statutes, as of 1986). "The Uniform Determination of Death Act 
adopts an alternative test: either the cardiopulmonary or the whole brain definition." Id. 
at 854-55 (citing UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr § 1, 12 U.L.A. 271 (Supp. 
1985)). 
75. Meadows v. State, 722 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Ark. 1987) ("The revised [manslaugh-
ter] statute used the term 'human being' rather than the presently used 'person,' but the 
terms are synonymous in common law."); Hogan v. Greenfield, 122 P.2d 850, 853, 58 
Wyo. 13,21 (1942) ('"Persons' are of two kinds, natural and artificial. A natural person is 
a human being.") (quoting legal dictionary). 
76. BLACK'S LAW DICI'IONARY 1028 (5th ed. 1979); FuNK & WAGNALL'S 
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more than human beings, but natural persons at common law en-
compassed all human beings.n Blackstone, in his section on the 
"law of persons," wrote that "persons also are divided by the law 
into either natural persons, or artificial"78 and held that life was 
"a right inherent by nature in every individual. "79 This tradition, 
however, is subject to increasing challenge.80 
There is considerable evidence that the Framers intended 
that the meaning of the word "persons" in the Fourteenth 
Amendment follow the common law rule and include all human 
beings.81 This is certainly what prominent members of the Thirty-
ninth Congress understood the text to mean, includin~ Con-
gressman Thaddeus Stevens,82 Senator Charles Sumner, Con-
DICTIONARY 489 (1984); WEBS1ER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1061 (1984). 
77. "In keeping with approved usage, and giving terms their ordinary meaning, the 
word 'person' is synonymous with the term 'human being."' Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 
N.E.2d 1324, 1325, 392 Mass. 799, 801 (1984). 
78. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 119 
(U. Chi. Pressed., 1979) (1765). 
79. Id. at 125. 
80. See, e.g., Norman L. Cantor, The Permanently Unconscious Patient, Nonfeeding 
and Euthanasia, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 381 (1989); Ronald E. Cranford & David Randolph 
Smith, Consciousness: The Most Critical Moral (Constitutional) Standard for Human Per-
sonhood. 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 233 (1987); Steven Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: 
Computers, Consciousness, and Nancy Cruzan, 43 STAN. L. REV. 659 (1991); Charles M. 
Kester, Is There A Person in That Body?: An Argument for the Priority of Persons and 
the Need for a New Legal Paradigm, 82 GEO. L.J. 1643 (1994); Douglas 0. Linder, The 
Other Right-To-Life Debate: When Does Founeenth Amendment "Life" End?, 37 ARIZ. 
L. REv. 1183 (1995); Deborah K. McKnight and Maureen Bellis, Foregoing Life-
Sustaining Treatment for Adult, Developmentally Disabled, Public Wards: A Proposed 
Statute, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 220 (1992) ("These patients (in a persistent vegetative 
state] have lost every quality associated with personhood, especially the ability to interact 
with others and their environment, and function at such a low level that they cannot 
properly be termed 'alive'."); Jens David Ohlin, Is the Concept of Person Necessary for 
Human Rights?, 105 CoLUM. L. REV. 209 (2005); David Randolph Smith, Legal Recogni-
tion of Neocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 850 {1986); Note, What We Talk About 
When We Talk About Persons: The Language of A Legal Fiction, 114 HAR.v. L. REV. 
1745 (2001). See Byrn v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp, 286 N.E.2d 887, 889, 31 
N.Y.2d 194, 200-01 (1972) ("(I]t is a policy determination whether legal personality 
should attach and not a question of biological or 'natural' correspondence."). See gener-
ally Robert A. Destro, Quality of Life Ethics and Constitutional Jurisprudence: The De-
mise of Natural Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and Incompetent, 2 J. 
CON1EMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 71 (1986). 
81. See generally Brief of American Center for Law & Justice, et al., Planned Par-
enthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 & 91-902). 
82. Representative Thaddeus Stevens, on the day the Thirteenth Amendment was 
ratified, stated: 
This is man's Government; the Government of all men alike; not that all men 
will have equal power and sway within it. Accidental circumstances, natural and 
acquired endowment and ability, will vary their fortunes. But equal rights to all 
the privileges of Government is innate in every immortal being, no matter what 
the shape or color of the tabernacle which it inhabits. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 74 (1865). 
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gressman John Bingham,84 Congressman Windom,85 Congress-
man James S. Brown,86 and Senator Trumbull.87 This should not 
be surprising since they were educated in the common law and 
formulated the Fourteenth Amendment against the backdrop of 
the natural rights doctrine of the common law and the Declara-
tion of Independence.88 
Blackstone's distinction between natural and artificial per-
sons is reflected in Justice Harlan's 1907 opinion in Western Turf 
Association v. Greenberg, which upheld the constitutionality of a 
California statute requiring a corporation to admit persons with 
a ticket of admission. 89 Justice Harlan denied that the corpora-
tion was protected under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, stating that "the liberty guaranteed by the 
83. "[I]n the eyes of the Constitution, every human being within its sphere ... from 
the President to the slave, is a person." CoNO. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1449 (1862) 
(emphasis in original). 
84. CoN G. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 542 (1867) 
([T]he Constitution of the United States ... declared that 'no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.' By that great 
law of ours it is not to be inquired whether a man is 'free' by the laws of Eng-
land; it is only to be inquired is he a man, and therefore free by the law of that 
creative energy which breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and he be-
came a living soul, endowed with the rights of life and liberty .... Before that 
great law the only question to be asked of a creature claiming its protection is 
this: Is he a man? Every man is entitled to the protection of American law, be-
cause its divine spirit of equality declares that all men are created equal.). 
See Destro, supra note 80, at 100 n.126. 
85. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866) (referring to rights to life, lib-
erty, and pursuit of happiness as "rights of human nature" and stating that the "right of 
human nature [is] the right to exist"). 
86. "[D]oes the term 'person' carry with it anything further than a simple allusion 
to the existence of the individual? It certainly cannot be strained into any recognition of 
slavery, since the very recognition of personality excludes [an institution which] does not 
regard its victims as persons but as chattels." CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1753 
(1864). 
87. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1866) ("[A]ny legislation or any public 
sentiment which deprives any human being in the land of those great rights of liberty will 
be in defiance of the constitution .... ").Senator Trumbell also noted the "great object of 
securing to every human being within the jurisdiction of the Republic equal rights before 
the law." /d. at 322. 
88. So, for example, Congressman Joshua Giddings stated in 1858: 
Our fathers, recognizing God as the author of human life, proclaimed it a 'self-
evident' truth that every human being holds from the Creator an inalienable 
right to live .... If this right be denied, no other can be acknowledged. If there 
be exceptions to this central, this universal proposition, that aU men, without re-
spect to complexion or condition, hold from the Creator the right to live, who 
shall determine what portion of the community shall be slain? And who may 
perpetrate the murders? 
CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong.1st Sess. App. 6~ (1858) (emphasis in original). 
89. 204 u.s. 359, 364 (1907). 
488 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:475 
Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation without due process 
of law is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons."90 
In Levy v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that it was a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to exclude illegitimate children from the protection 
of a state wrongful death statute. 91 The Court "start[ ed] from the 
premise that illegitimate children are not 'nonpersons.' They are 
humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly 'persons' 
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."92 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, Inc., the Court assumed that "mentally retarded" per-
sons are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that 
discrimination on the basis of mental disability triggers equal 
protection scrutiny.93 
Contrary to the common law and previous Supreme Court 
decisions, Roe v. Wade is sometimes cited as the exception that 
contradicts the proposition that "person" within the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses all human beings.94 
Roe held that "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not include the "unbom."95 Roe often has 
90. !d. at 363 (citing Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906)). See 
also Riggs, 203 U.S. at 255 ("The liberty referred to in that Amendment is the liberty of 
natural, not artificial persons."). County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 
U.S. 394, 396 (1886), had previously held that corporations were persons for equal pro-
tection purposes. Justices Douglas and Black subsequently expressed doubts about the 
validity of Santa Clara. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-80 (1949) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 
(1938) (Black, J., dissenting). 
91. 391 u.s. 68,72 (1968). 
92 !d. at 70. See also Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968) 
("To say that the test of equal protection should be the 'legal' rather than the biological 
relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection Oause necessarily limits the 
authority of the State to draw such 'legal' lines as it chooses."). 
93. 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985) ("[T)he mentally retarded, like others, have and retain 
their substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be treated equally by the 
law."). See generally Carla Dowben, Legal Rights of the Mentally Impaired, 16 Hous. L. 
REV. 833 (1979); Benjamin N. Schoenfeld, A Survey of the Constitutional Rights of the 
Mentally Retarded, 32 Sw. L.J. 605 (1978); Diane M. Weidert, Constitutional Rights of the 
Involuntarily Committed Mentally Retarded After Youngberg v. Romeo, 14 ST. MARY's 
L.J. 1113 (1983). 
94. Linder, supra note 80, at, 1189-92. 
95. 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973). The history offered by the Court in Roe has been 
demonstrated to be erroneous. See, e.g., JOSEPH DElLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS 
OF ABORTION HISTORY (Carolina Academic Press 2006); Robert A. Destro, Abortion 
and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CAL. L. REv. 1250 
(1975); Dennis J. Horan, Oarke D. Forsythe, Edward R. Grant, Two Ships Passing in the 
Night: An Interpretavist Review of the White-Stevens Colloquy on Roe v. Wade, 6 ST. 
LoUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 229 (1987); James S. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth 
Century Abonion Statutes and the Founeenth Amendment, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 29 (1985). 
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been cited as a judicial embarrassment however much judges 
and scholars like the political result.96 There is compelling his-
torical evidence "that the legislatures ratifying the Fourteenth 
Amendment did consider human fetuses to be persons. "97 Roe 
was simply wrong on the law's historic protection of human life.98 
Since the common law, homicide law has protected the hu-
man being as human. It is ~ecies-specific and focuses on pro-
tecting the biological being. This is reinforced, even today, by 
the consensus across nearly all 50 states definin§ "death" as car-
aiopulmonary death or "whole brain death." 00 Whole brain 
death signifies the imminent demise of the individual as an inte-
grated, functioning organism. 
Over the past half century, the traditional natural rights 
ethic has been challenged by proponents of a quality of life ethic. 
The traditional natural rights ethic was supported by the com-
mon law, as Framer and Justice James Wilson recognized: 
With consistency, beautiful and undeviating, human life, from 
its commencement to its close, is protected by the common 
law. In the contemplation of law, life begins when the infant is 
first able to stir in the womb. By the law, life is protected not 
only from immediate destruction, but from every degree of 
actual violence, and, in some cases, from every degree of dan-
101 ger. 
The traditional ethic is based on the nature of human beings as 
rational creatures and reflects "a shared moral outlook that 
characterizes life as sacred, and as an inalienable human right. "102 
As the Declaration of Independence expounded, the ethic lies at 
the foundation of government by the consent of the people. This 
96. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 
YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973) ("It (Roe] is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather 
because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to 
be."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Paulsen, 1., Dissenting, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD 
HAVE SAID 196, 196-97 (Jack Balkin ed., 2005). 
97. Witherspoon, supra note 95, at 31; id. app. at 72 (detailing state statutes). 
98. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 95. 
99. See, e.g., Kester, supra note 80, at 1646-47 ("Traditionally, the law has con-
ferred legal standing upon any human body capable of independent integrated function-
ing, that is, upon any 'living' human organism."). 
100. See 1 MEISEL & CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE 
DECISIONMAKING 626-27 (2d ed. 1995) (Table 9-3) (50-state chart). 
101. JAMES WILSON, "On the Natural Rights of Individuals," in THE WORKS OF 
JAMES WILSON 296,316 (2 James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896). The same passage can be 
found in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 596-97 (2 Robert G. McOoskey ed., 1967). 
102. DYCK, supra note 50, at 7. See also People v. Sessions, 26 N.W. 291, 293, 58 
Mich. 594,596 (1886) ("At common law life is not only sacred but it is inalienable."). 
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ethic was explained, as noted above, in the majority opinion in 
Glucksberg. 
In contrast, modem proponents of a quality of life ethic 
have offered a novel, instrumentalist justification for traditional 
prohibitions against suicide and homicide.103 They claim that "the 
reason that killing is wrong is that the one being killed does not 
wish to be killed"104 or that killing is wrong because "the indi-
viduals killed are deprived of interests they might otherwise pur-
sue. "
105 If killing is wrong due to the existence of personal inter-
ests (rather than intrinsic human worth), the elimination of those 
interests (through disability) eliminates the wrongfulness of both 
suicide and homicide. With this novel rationale, proponents 
"have abandoned, or at least undermined, the moral structure 
that serves as the principled basis for homicide law. "106 Conse-
quently, as the Wendland decision indicates, clear quality of life 
assessments are involved. 
In cases like that of Theresa Schiavo, when no advanced di-
rective existed, the continuance of feeding tubes to profoundly 
mentally disabled patients who cannot feed themselves should 
be evaluated under a "best interests" calculus that weighs the 
benefits and burdens of the particular treatment to the patient 
under the particular medical circumstances. Traditionally, medi-
cal ethics distinguished "ordinary" and "extraordinary" treat-
ment; while that principle remains true, medical ethicists have, 
more recently, sought to distinguish "proportionate" and "dis-
proportionate" means, believing that the latter is clearer. Never-
theless, both really weigh the benefits and burdens of the par-
ticular treatment to the particular patient under the particular 
medical conditions. 
103. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. ClnLDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
Ennes (5th ed. 2002); RONAW F. DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT 
ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDoM 179-217 (1993). For a 
critique of Dworkin, see Gerard V. Bradley, Life's Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 (1993); Richard Stith, The Priority of Respect: How Our 
Common Humanity Can Ground Our Individual Dignity, 44 INT'L PHIL. Q. 165 (June 
2004); Richard Stith, On Death and Dworkin: A Critique of His Theory of Inviolability, 56 
MD. L. REv. 289 (1997). 
104. DYCK, supra note 50, at 7. 
105. Id. at 43. 
106. Id. at 44. See also WESLEY J. SMITH, CULTURE OF DEATH: THE ASSAULT ON 
MEDICAL Ennes IN AMERICA 125-43 (2000); Destro, supra note 80; Germain Grisez, 
Should Nutrition and Hydration Be Provided to Permanently Unconscious and Other 
Mentally Disabled Persons?, 5 ISSUES IN L. & MEn. 165 (1989) (supporting provision of 
nutrition and hydration). 
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Even though the precise diagnosis of Schiavo's neurological 
state was uncertain, the number of years that had passed since 
the original hypoxic ischemic event made it very unlikely that 
she would recover the neurological capacity to feed herself. 107 
There was no compelling evidence of her awareness/08 but that 
should not be ethically determinative. Her neurological impair-
ment was such that there was no evidence that she suffered, 
physically or psychologically.109 Her status as a human being 
should not be questioned by her state of awareness. 
Whether or not the patient's wishes would be determinative 
in withdrawing the feeding tube if they were known, the fact 
here is that there is little reliable evidence of the patient's 
wishes. No advanced directive was ever executed, and oral 
statements were few, not widely communicated, general and 
ambiguous.110 The husband did not come forth with the claim 
about her wishes until several years after she collapsed.111 Since 
her wishes could not be reliably known, it cannot be said that the 
purpose of withdrawing the feeding tube is to fulfill her wishes. 
Because the feeding tube did not impose an objective or 
subjective burden to Schiavo, the feeding tube was not a dispro-
portionate measure. The feeding tube did what it was designed 
to do-nourish her. It could not be considered futile for its rea-
sonably intended purpose. There was no underlying terminal or 
chronic condition that would take her life, assuming the feeding 
tube and normal nursing care were provided.112 
Some may ask, what is the "benefit" of continuing to feed a 
person in Schiavo's state? This implies that, if the patient cannot 
appreciate any benefit, continued feeding has no benefit. The fo-
cus of the benefits and burdens calculus, however, is on the ef-
fectiveness of the feeding (a more objective question), not the 
benefit of life itself (a more subjective question). The objective 
question is appropriate to the particular expertise of the medical 
profession; the subjective question is a broader social concern 
that is more appropriately determined by societal norms and 
law. Because Schiavo was not terminally ill or imminently dying 
from an underlying condition, the feeding tube had been and 
107. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 325-27 (Fla. 2004), cen. denied, 543 U.S. 1121 
(2005). 
108. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d at 325, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121. 
109. See Schiavo, 885 So. 2d at 325, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121. 
110. See Schiavo, 885 So. 2d at 325-28, cen. denied, 543 U.S. 1121. 
111. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d at 325, cen. denied, 543 U.S. 1121. 
112 See Schiavo, 885 So. 2d at 325, cen. denied, 543 U.S. 1121. 
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continued to be effective in sustaining her, and her wishes were 
not reliably known. Guardianship should have been shifted to 
her parents (and siblings), who were willing to care for her, when 
her husband became unwilling or unable to do so for whatever 
reason. 
V. STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
Given the experience with the growth of euthanasia in the 
Netherlands, there is a clear risk that the practice of euthanasia 
in the United States could grow unless restrained by law.113 In the 
nearly 30 years since the Quinlan decision, the growth of case 
law and state legislation has promoted passive euthanasia in the 
United States, with the law in virtually all states allowing the 
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration to end an incompetent pa-
tient's life.114 The Wendland and Schiavo cases remind us that the 
care of the neurologically impaired and medically dependent and 
disabled is still unsettled, and more needs to be done to avoid 
similar family conflicts over the care of the medically dependent 
in the future. The Schiavo case confirms that future legal and 
cultural challenges that threaten to further weaken traditional 
prohibitions against euthanasia will require legislative answers to 
shore up protection for the medically dependent and disabled. 
Eric Cohen, the editor of The New Atlantis and a resident 
scholar at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, has reframed the 
issue in the Schiavo case: 
We have asked whether she is really in a persistent vegetative 
state, instead of reflecting on what we owe people in a persis-
tent vegetative state. We have asked what she would have 
wanted as a competent person imagining herself in such a 
condition, instead of asking what we owe the person who is 
now with us, a person who can no longer speak for herself, a 
person entrusted to the care of her family and the protection 
of her society .... Treating autonomy as an absolute makes a 
person's dignity turn entirely on his or her capacity to act 
113. See CARLOS GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND TilE CASE OF 
THE NETIIERLANDS (1991); HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOCTORS, 
PATIENTS AND TIIE DUTCH CURE 135-55 (1997); K Green, Physician-Assisted Suicide 
And Euthanasia: Safeguarding Against the 'Slippery Slope'-The Netherlands Versus the 
United States, 13 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 639 (2003); John Keown, Euthanasia in the 
Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope, 9 NOTRE DAME J .L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 
407 (1995). 
114. Edward R. Grant & Cathleen A. Oeaver, A Line Less Reasonable: Cruzan and 
the Looming Debate Over Active Euthanasia, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 99 
(1991). 
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autonomously. It leads to the view that only those with the 
ability to express their will possess any dignity at all .... "115 
493 
Under economic and social pressures, health care experts 
have been debating the ethical and legal authority to withdraw 
treatment that is "futile."116 It seems inevitable that efforts to 
withdraw treatment, including nutrition and hydration, based on 
judgments of "futility" will increase in health care institutions in 
the near future. In a certain narrow sense, physicians have tradi-
tionally had the authority to withdraw medical treatment that is 
truly futile, in the sense of providing no benefit in treating the 
patient's underlying medical condition for which it was originally 
prescribed. The prospect is that "futility" will come to mean any 
• • 117 
care to unconscious patients. 
Hence, states should consider legislation that increases legal 
protection for unconscious, medically-dependent persons. This 
could include laws that (1) enhance the educational value of liv-
ing will forms, (2) limit claims of medical "futility" to treatments 
which fail to achieve their intended purpose, (3) adopt presump-
tions in favor of sustaining the lives of unconscious persons if 
they do not execute advance directives,118 (4) enhance judicial 
evaluation of conflicts of interests by guardians, (5) ensure that 
guardians are exercising informed consent, and ( 6) clarify proce-
dures to ensure efficient resolution when the guardian's decision 
is challenged by family members.119 
There are many problems with the Schiavo case, but four 
stand out: the conflict of interest by the guardian, the contro-
versy over Schiavo's uncertain neurological state, the lack of 
deference given to the willingness of her parents, the Schindlers, 
115. Eric Cohen, How Liberalism Failed Terri Schiavo, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 
i\pr.4,2005,at19,21,22. 
116. See, e.g., WESLEY J. SMITH, supra note 106, at 125-43; Laurence B. McCul-
lough, The Hidden Issue in Futility Judgments: Justifying Turning the Traditional Logic of 
Beneficience on Its Head, in EUTIIANASIA: THE GOOD OF lHE PATIENT, THE GOOD OF 
SoCIETY, supra note 4, at 139. 
117. See WESLEY J. SMITH, supra note 106, 125-43. 
118. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990) ("It is 
also worth noting that most, if not all, States simply forbid oral testimony entirely in de-
termining the wishes of parties in transactions which, while important, simply do not 
have the consequences that a decision to terminate a person's life does."). 
119. Cf In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 71-72 (Wis. 1992) (adopting a 
three-part test to ensure the dispute is handled fairly and expeditiously: the presumption 
should be that continued life is in the best interests of the ward; the guardian has the 
burden to show the existence of PVS to a high degree of medical certainty; and the deci-
sion to withhold or withdraw treatment is in the ward's best interests and was made in 
good faith). 
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to act as caregiver for their disabled daughter, and the fiction 
that incompetent patients have-through the doctrine of "substi-
tuted judgment"-"the same right to refuse medical treatment as 
a competent person."12° Courts persist in this fiction in cases, like 
Theresa Schiavo's, where the patient left no written statement of 
her wishes; the "substituted judgment" is made by a guardian 
with a significant conflict of interest; and the patient's contempo-
rary wishes, in the context of her current medical condition, can-
not be ascertained. The parents' willingness to care for Theresa 
Schiavo was treated as entirely subordinate to the fiction that 
her "desires" were known and would be faithfully implemented 
by the guardian. "Substituted judgment" is a fiction because it 
cannot satisfy key criteria for decision-making by a competent 
patient: 
(1) [T]he patient must have the capacity to make the decision; 
(2) the patient must be able to decide voluntarily, free from 
coercion; (3) the patient must receive sufficient information to 
make a good decision; and (4) the patient must come to a 
genuine understandinl! of the nature and implications of the 
12t' proposed treatment. 
A competent, able-bodied, substitute decision-maker cannot 
make such a decision for an incompetent patient because such 
decisions can only be informed if the ~atient makes the decision 
in the context of his or her own illness. 22 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Cruzan and Glucksberg affirmed 
that the states have an "unqualified interest in preserving human 
life" and therefore do not have to allow suicide or euthanasia in 
cases of "diminished" quality of life. Despite Cruzan and 
Glucksberg, the Supreme Court denied review (at least four 
120. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321,326 (Fla. 2004) (citing the court's prior decision 
in In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla. 1990)). See generally Walter M. 
Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 131 
(1985}. 
121. JOHN KILNER, LIFE ON TIIE LINE: ETHICS, AGING, ENDING PATIENTS' LIVES, 
AND ALLOCATING VITAL RESOURCES ~5 (1992). 
122. "Best interests" might conceivably be a better standard than "substituted judg-
ment," but the California Court of Appeals in the Wendland case (later overturned by 
the supreme court) used a "best interests" standard to agree with a conservator that 
Robert Wendland would be better off dead. 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 556 (Cal. a. App. 
2000}. A "best interests" standard would have to be appropriately defined by statute. 
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times) in Schiavo,123 implying that the Court did not believe that 
the procedures applied by the Florida courts unconstitutionally 
denied Terri Schiavo due process or the equal protection of the 
law. Enhanced legal protection will have to come, if at all, 
through state legislatures. 
Nearly twenty years ago, it was observed that there has 
been an "ongoing process by which a 'quality-of-life' ethic is be-
ing adopted in place of the original natural rights ethic which has 
governed American law since the Declaration of Independence," 
and "the primary method being utilized by courts and commen-
tators to effect the change from the original natural rights ... 
ethic to one which rests upon the quality of a given life to society 
is a functional definition of what it means to be a human per-
son."124 Twenty years later, Schiavo is recent evidence that courts 
have abandoned their assumed role in protecting human rights 
and that legislatures will have to preserve the natural rights ethic 
over the functional understanding of human persons. It is timely 
to recall, as Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "that legislatures 
are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people 
in quite as great a degree as the courts."125 
123. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1121 (2005); Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 
321! application _for stay of enforcement denied, 544 U.S. 915 (2005); Schiavo ex reL 
Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005), application for stay of enforcement 
denied, 544_D.~· 945 (2005); Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 
2005), applicatzon for stay of enforcement denied, 544 U.S. 957 (2005). 
124. Destro, supra note 80, at 87-88 (1986). 
125. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904). 
